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Abstract 
 Pleasure experienced in an unpleasant film genre, like horror, has prompted 
numerous discussions in film studies. Noted scholars like Carol J. Clover and Noël 
Carroll have rationalized spectatorial enjoyment of a genre that capitalizes on human 
anxieties and complicates cultural categories. Clover admits that horror initially satisfies 
sadistic tendencies in young male viewers but then pushes them to cross gender lines and 
identify with the strong female heroine who defeats the film’s threat. Carroll provides a 
basic explanation, citing spectators’ cognitive curiosity as the source of pleasure. Both 
scholars are right to consider emotional, psychological, and cognitive experiences felt by 
viewers, but the main objective of this thesis moves beyond one particular demographic 
and considers how spectatorial experiences can differ radically but still offer pleasure.  
 This work involves a methodology, Theory of Mind (ToM), that addresses the 
basic yet complex issues that inform spectatorial interactions with the horror film. Clover, 
Carroll, and others agree that viewers realize violations to cultural conventions occur in 
horror. Therefore, these anticipations, anxieties, curiosities, and tendencies of the 
spectator exist before and after a film rather than taking place within the two hours of 
watching its narrative. ToM is a cognitive ability that allows individuals to predict and 
make sense of others’ behavior and underlying mental states and is a hardwired faculty 
that undergoes constant conditioning to ensure individuals can better interact with their 
environments, whether real or fictional. With horror, expectations are challenged, since 
spectators are forced to renegotiate cultural knowledge, as horror does not adhere to 
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convention. Horror exercises ToM intensely, but as this project proves, it is a pleasurable 
workout.  
 Ridley Scott’s 1979 sci-fi horror film, Alien, is this work’s case study, because it 
falls into the horror genre and challenges a few culturally-imposed binaries that are 
entangled in the film, including human/android and masculine/feminine. As this thesis 
shows, these entanglements demonstrate how ToM is both biological/cultural and is not 
categorized as a programmed mechanism in humans. With these enmeshed binaries, this 
study argues that Alien involves posthumanism, because it rejects traditional categories of 
identification and information and embodies fluidity. This works for ToM, since it is an 
ever-developing and conditioned process of observing and anticipating behavior. ToM is 
also posthuman, because information does not remain stagnant but is challenged or 
modified constantly in pleasurable ways. By witnessing the contradictions and 
complications of cultural categories through Alien’s characters, spectators can learn to 
observe the flux of identity outside the film’s narrative, too.  Because this learning 
process is in constant motion, this thesis points out how horror’s stimulation and 
development of it are enjoyable.   
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Chapter One:  
Forecasts in Space: An Introduction to Mind Reading  
in Ridley Scott’s Alien  
 Without having to openly gaze upon its narrative, the horror film is generally 
viewed as a cinematic work that instigates unsettling emotions for its spectators. Ridley 
Scott’s Alien (1979) is one such visual fiction that seems to confound scholarly 
discussion of its spectatorial pleasure. Set in an archetypal Terrible Place “where no one 
can hear you scream,” Alien transgresses spectators’ known environments and presents 
life forms and a space-place that are strange yet somehow familiar.1 Typical of its horror 
roots, the narrative elements in Alien bear a semblance to spectators’ realities but are all 
somehow grossly fantastic or irrational: an android passes for a human, an alien planet 
has the impression of a Southwestern desert, an alien creature has the characteristics of a 
human, not to mention the film’s characters appear both gendered and genderless. This 
blurring of cultural categories is a common feat in horror films like Alien, but since it 
defies what spectators know and anticipate, one may pose the question, “What is 
pleasurable about this challenge for viewers of the horror film?” Cinematic pleasure lies 
in a specific cognitive ability, I respond, which horror most strongly tests and Alien fully 
demonstrates: the ability to mind read.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In her seminal text, Men, Women, and Chainsaws: Gender in the Modern Horror Film, Carol J. Clover identifies the 
Terrible Place as a space that “may at first seem a safe haven, but the same walls that promise to keep the killer out 
quickly become, once the killer penetrates them, the walls that hold the victim in” (30). 
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 To date, critical reception of Alien features a substantial amount of scholarship, 
which delves into feminist and Marxist areas of discussion. The film’s representations of 
powerful female signifiers, issues of production or reproduction, and the greed of a 
capitalist corporation are among the pivotal themes analyzed. James H. Kavanagh, for 
example, notes the power of the “woman-signifier,” since Alien’s Ellen Ripley becomes 
the knowledgeable and autonomous hero as well as the “strong centre of the film” (75). 
Others, like Barbara Creed, also explore the film’s feminine signifiers by examining 
figures like the alien, yet these comments are fixated on femininity as a manifestation of 
anxieties of difference and castration rather than a presentation of Kavanagh’s ‘strong 
centre.’ Vivian Sobchack also reveals how Alien’s narrative presents the absence of sex 
as a repressive force. All such discussions of the genre address Alien with concepts and 
methods of psychoanalysis that expertly politicize feminist theory. Accordingly, my 
argument acknowledges feminist concerns, like gender differences and identification, 
since they function as cultural information that influences spectators’ experience with and 
interpretation of Alien. For example, taboos, anxieties, and identity constructs jointly 
create the context within which a horror film like Alien engages.  
 But striving to rationalize spectatorial enjoyment of such films, the evocation of 
obscured realities and blurred cultural categories in horror cinema has also been of 
interest to scholars. I start with Carol J. Clover’s work from 1992 as the last great 
hallmark of scholarly discussion that repositions and rethinks pleasure in horror. 
Challenging traditional notions about enjoyment from the horror (mainly ‘slaher’) film, 
she suggests that more is at stake than the fulfillment of sadistic tendencies in male 
viewers. A vacillation of viewers’ identification between the ‘castrated’ killer and 
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‘phallicized’ victim-hero is Clover’s key observation, and her main concern follows the 
phenomenon of the slasher film’s ‘Final Girl’ formula. The lure of the Final Girl plot, 
Clover explains, pivots on male viewers’ need to identify with the film’s heroine so as to 
partake of the abject terror culturally denied them as well as the pleasure of overcoming 
the threat. Clover’s theory is undoubtedly significant, since it describes a cinematic 
interaction that both challenges and engages spectators rather than treating the horror film 
as a one-sided sadistic service. But Clover’s ideas are largely exclusive to the male 
viewer. Since spectatorship is not restricted to one demographic or a single experience 
garnered from a film, it is valuable to consider a source of pleasure that encompasses all 
spectators and offers multiple consequences beyond identification. After all, horror films 
are viewed by both sexes who bear a range of cinematic preferences and cultural 
experiences. Theory of Mind, or what I call mind reading, cultivates spectatorial pleasure 
according to spectators’ experiences before, during, and following the viewing of a film. 
 To suggest each person has the capacity to mind read is not to say everyone has 
telepathic superpowers. Rather, ToM is a cognitive faculty that helps humans interpret 
and anticipate behavior in others. Drawing on new observations and lasting memories, 
individuals build educated guesses about what others are thinking or how they are feeling 
and attribute various mental states to them. For example, in Alien’s final scene, spectators 
may infer that Ellen Ripley slowly puts on her spacesuit while breathing heavily, because 
she nervously tries to avoid waking the alien creature and not, for example, because her 
body is fatigued. The process of ToM helps viewers make such interpretations while 
anticipating more actions like, “Will Ripley defeat the alien creature in this final 
encounter?” As this example shows, ToM produces pleasure through the interpretations 
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that individuals create. Spectatorial enjoyment is therefore not produced by a finite or 
universal assumption about Ripley’s circumstance but in the stimulation and ongoing use 
of ToM, which improves upon this cognitive faculty and helps to eliminate possible 
wrong observations in the future. 
 When applied to cinema, ToM allows spectators to navigate fictional worlds and 
develop inferences about the characters in them. Film genres frequently follow certain 
tropes and plot formulas that make it easy for a spectator to determine, for instance, that 
the initially reluctant couple in a RomCom will unite by the movie’s end. Clichés and 
gimmicks are exploited in the horror genre as well, but whether low-budget, art house, or 
semi-comedic, all horror capitalizes on plot twists and sudden shockers. More 
importantly, it complicates the cultural categories with which spectators interpret any 
film. These twists, shocks, and complications terminate a spectator’s early assumptions 
about characters and situations as quickly as the story’s first victim. Alien notably boasts 
figures that are not who they appear to be, mysterious foreign threats, and disruptions of 
gender conventions. Thus while all cinematic works engage spectators’ cognitions, the 
horror genre especially prods viewers to interpret and reinterpret actions and behaviors. 
Spectators’ ToM not only gets ‘worked out’ in the sense of exercising the cognitive 
faculty that is ToM, but what spectators know and believe is also stretched to the limit as 
they try to understand and anticipate what is happening in horror’s strange or disturbing 
world. 
In determining how spectators could find this unpleasant and challenging material 
pleasurable, I turn to Noël Carroll’s work, which utilizes cognitive psychology to analyze 
what he calls the “paradox of horror” (10). Carroll chiefly claims that we are interested in 
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how “certain forces, once put in motion, will work themselves out. Pleasure derives from 
having our interest in the outcome of such questions satisfied” (179). Carroll’s comments 
certainly bring ToM to the fore, since people keep track of the behavior and actions of 
other individuals, whether fictional or not, and try to anticipate their intentions and 
outcomes. However, I argue that pleasure is in the process of working material out rather 
than just reaching various conclusions about it. By emphasizing ToM’s process, I avoid 
explanations that are rooted in finality and definitive solutions. After all, spectators can 
and do watch films they enjoy more than once, so even though questions about certain 
forces are already satisfied, as Carroll puts it, viewers still find pleasure in subsequent 
viewings of a film, because ToM is constantly engaged. Whether in cinema or reality, the 
conclusions individuals make are always kept under advisement as new information 
alters, challenges, or adds to inferences already made. 
 Hinged on cognitive studies, Byron Reeves’ and Clifford Nass’ book, The Media 
Equation: How People Treat Computers, Television, and New Media Like Real People 
and Places, analyzes the way spectators approach various approach technologies such as 
film. Reeves and Nass conclude that when people respond to media, their “automatic 
response” is “to accept what seems to be real as in fact real” (8). Violent images, for 
instance, threaten individuals, as Reeves and Nass discover (8). This explains why many 
viewers may feel anxious after watching a fictional horror narrative, and I argue that, 
since ToM principally evolved to interpret non-verbal behavior, visual fictions can profit 
from this cognitive faculty greatly. Reeves and Nass help underscore my claim by 
revealing that humans expect media technologies to follow social and natural rules (5). In 
film, this expectation would certainly pertain to the on-screen characters, because they 
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simulate the social values of viewers’ known world. Since ToM allows viewers to track 
characters’ behavior, interests, and motives to anticipate possible actions, both the 
characters in and spectators of Alien carefully follow the behavior of the Nostromo’s 
crew to predict likely responses. Of course, Alien also departs from social and natural 
conventions. For this reason, I contend that it and other horror films engage spectators’ 
ToM in particularly intense ways. I borrow this notion of intensity from Lisa Zunshine 
who similarly proposes in Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel that 
some fictional works, whether visual or written, “experiment with our ToM more 
intensely than others” (162). Zunshine also suggests that certain texts “find their readers, 
that is, the people who like their ToM teased in [a] particular manner” (162). Zunshine’s 
claim is indeed true, but I contend that all manners of ToM workout are pleasurable, 
including those the horror film presents, since readers’/spectators’ mind-reading ability is 
always stimulated and always modified; preferences of the reader/spectator can be 
created, adapted, and transformed continuously.    
 Without a doubt, Alien seeks to preserve a level of mystery surrounding its 
characters and plot, thus lending itself to the genre of intensity and teasing people’s ToM. 
It presents uncanny material and violates, in quite critical ways, the ordered reality that 
spectators understand. Alien therefore renegotiates viewers’ cultural knowledge. Going 
against the real world they understand, spectators must reconcile these violations and 
reeducate themselves in order to predict or properly categorize the unusual and/or 
uncomfortable information. Yet this renegotiating of cultural categories is pleasurable, 
since it exercises and enhances viewers’ ToM and pushes them to be conscious of fluid 
information. Of equal importance, characters in Alien lay bare the functions of ToM and 
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demonstrate its value to viewers. For instance, anticipating another’s next move is a 
matter of survival for the human crew aboard the Nostromo and an issue of strategy for 
both the alien creature and the cyborg, Ash.  
 Among countless instances of ToM play in Alien, the opening scene aptly 
illustrates the cognitive interplay that will recur throughout the narrative. In fact, the title 
sequence is an appetizer to the feast; it precedes all exposition but still prompts the 
spectator to employ preexisting information for predicting forthcoming events. To start, 
viewers begin observing the film aware they are watching a work entitled Alien. A single 
slash appears on the right-hand corner of the screen followed by a corresponding 
backslash on the left. Then, balancing these two typographical marks, a single upright 
line appears in the center. In a systematic pattern, more lines appear at various angles to 
form letters in anticipation of the end result: the word ALIEN spelled in white typeface. 
But before reaching this product, spectators can already determine what is happening. 
They soon realize the slash is the slanted arm of an ‘A’ or the line is the stem of an ‘L.’ 
The film exposes a little, and spectators use their contextual knowledge to calculate a 
meaning. Therefore, in the most simplistic and literal fashion, Alien’s opening credits 
have already demonstrated pleasurable ToM interaction; its spectators predict what is 
being spelled out before the word is achieved. The anticipation, observation, and 
cultivation of knowledge from the film provide enjoyable stimulation of ToM. Though 
barely a scratch on the surface of this discussion, this brief and seemingly insignificant 
scene holds out a demonstration for the way in which spectator/film ToM relations work 
and how pleasure is released in the process. It also exhibits how Alien, as an example of 
the horror genre, purposely withholds information and reveals minute details bit by bit. 
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 As scenes like this from Alien’s opening demonstrate, there is a cognitive impulse 
in spectators to interpret and interact with the narrative, but, as I argue throughout this 
study, ToM is not contingent on biological impulses alone. It is an inherent and 
hardwired cognitive ability, but one that requires knowledge of environment, including 
people’s behavior and cultural representations, to work properly. In evolutionary 
discourse, ToM is often described as an added feature, increasing an individual’s chances 
of survival. Within the reality of the film, recognizing villains and hero-survivors serves 
ToM’s biological and social purpose, because predicting an enemy or an ally increases 
the characters’ chances of survival and ability to adapt to numerous social environments. 
In terms of cinema and spectatorship, the recognition of threatened and threatening 
characters also improves viewers’ mind-reading capabilities through interpretations and 
deployments of accumulated knowledge. Modern horror deliberately challenges 
spectators; heroes and villains are sometimes wrongly identified, and threats may be left 
unresolved or unexplained, but it is these challenges that provoke further mind reading 
and produce pleasure. Whether assumptions are correct or not, spectatorial enjoyment is 
illustrated reciprocally, as ToM stimulates pleasure, and horror films like Alien strongly 
stimulate ToM. 
 Critics of ToM wrongly assume this cognitive faculty is ahistorical. As I 
demonstrate in my research, ToM is not a simple artifact of biological hardwiring; it is 
unquestionably context-dependent. To borrow Lisa Zunshine’s words: 
  Attributing states of mind is the default way by which we construct our  
  social environment…[ToM] is supported not by one uniform cognitive  
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  adaptation but by a large cluster of specialized adaptations geared toward  
  a variety of social contexts (6, 8).  
Zunshine is claiming that the ToM function is context-sensitive as a result of our 
development as a social species (8). Spectators, as part of a social species, may have a 
preoccupation with sorting out truth from fiction when watching horror cinema, but their 
understanding of the two is unquestionably context-dependent. In short, ToM is an 
intrinsic mental trait that is manifested and developed by a variety of social contexts. In 
fact, as I have suggested, these very contexts are challenged by the complicated material 
horror presents. Questions of history, gender, and, in the case of Alien, humanness itself 
should not be overlooked, since they are biological social constructions that constitute 
viewers’ ToM. Feelings of confusion, shock, or uncanniness are only achieved if films 
acknowledge what spectators deem ordinary by deliberately going against it. As viewers 
compare Alien’s narrative with what they understand to be accurate in their own realities, 
they may experience displeasure, but they also enjoy exercising their ToM while 
watching characters do the same. Besides, spectatorial enjoyment is generated through 
the meeting of biological urges and cultural conditioning; this process opens up 
possibilities for seeing cultural changes outside Alien’s narrative as well.  
 I have selected Alien as my object of study, because it presents ToM’s meeting of 
the biological and the cultural with striking precision. A literal manifestation of 
hardwiring appears in the film’s male cyborg Ash, whereas the female human, Ripley, 
exhibits the influences of culture and environment on her development. But, as I stress 
throughout this study, both characters illustrate the influences of biological and cultural 
ToM and demonstrate how these influences are constantly intertwined. ToM’s biological 
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and cultural impulses are dependent on each other, and the interaction of these two 
previously separated spheres opens up posthuman possibilities. The posthuman, then, is 
in the act of embodying fluid identities and perceiving the world as made up of such, too. 
As representative of the horror genre at large, Alien’s value lies in its ability to challenge 
multiple differences, including biological/cultural, masculine/feminine, human/android—
and even nature/nurture. For this reason, the following chapters of my study will focus on 
one of the two characters, Ash and Ripley, and a corresponding term from each of the 
foregoing oppositions. Additionally, I devote Chapter Two to the intrinsic biological 
features of ToM, while in Chapter Three, I discuss the social environment that constantly 
informs it. Though apparently divided, the rhetorical purpose of this biological/cultural 
separation is not only to flesh out each with an extensive analysis, but also to prove how, 
on a posthumanist level, the numerous binaries initially presented in Ash and Ripley 
continuously complicate and modify each other and are difficult to sever. 
 The second chapter, “The Hardwired Mind: Programmed Character and  
Spectator Theories of Mind in Alien,” involves the cyborg character, Ash, and ToM’s 
biological function, since Ash and ToM are presumably examples of hardwired or fixed 
features. Scenes analyzed in this section involve Ash and his application of ToM with 
other characters and specifically address how he anticipates others’ thoughts and at times 
influences them for his programmed directive. Ash’s hardwired circuitry is also linked to 
spectators’ ToM and its biological origins and structures; however, because Ash is not 
alone on the Nostromo but placed in a social environment, I stress the importance of how 
he understands and predicts human complexities and conditions his ToM as a result. In 
terms of spectatorship and cultural constructs, Ash’s blurring of gendered and ‘human’ 
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behavior challenges cultural knowledge and viewers’ readings of Alien, which provides 
multiple illustrations of horror’s splits from spectatorial expectations, since the gendered 
conduct and posthuman conditions of the film’s characters go against convention. What’s 
more, like the instinctive and learned facets of ToM, gender and humanness already 
invite a debate on whether they are naturally or culturally constructed. Through the 
anticipation, learning, and reconsideration of information that viewers interpret from 
Alien, ToM is pleasantly stimulated. Since ToM is a process, constant enhancement is 
beneficial to the spectator. Enriching my discussion in this chapter, I will also provide 
evidence of a breakdown of the masculine/feminine and human/android dichotomies 
present in Ash and Ripley and suggest that the complication of these binaries creates a 
posthuman transformation for these characters and spectators’ ToM.   
 Chapter Three, “The Conditioned Mind: Contextualizing Character and  
Spectator Theories of Mind in Alien,” then directs its focus to the character Ripley, along 
with the spectators’ contextual histories that help shape their readings of Alien. I suggest 
that Ripley’s and spectators’ experiences are affected by their surroundings and therefore 
comprise a majority of the ‘conditioned’ aspect of ToM. For example, Ripley’s 
familiarity with the Company’s greed, the alien’s method of breeding, and distrustful 
cyborgs are all past experiences influencing her ensuing actions with and assumptions 
about others. I gloss one scene from the Alien sequel, Aliens, to demonstrate this, 
particularly since Ripley’s ToM is modified throughout her narrative. I repeatedly draw a 
parallel between Ripley’s and spectators’ ToM development, since the narrative also 
moves viewers to use their collected knowledge and life experiences when anticipating 
and navigating the fictional worlds with which they interact. Ripley’s character appears 
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throughout the Alien quadrilogy and illustrates ToM expansion, since her opinions and 
assumptions about others stem from what she has learned. In fact, Ripley’s experience 
with Ash inevitably affects her relations with all other androids presented in the series, 
but her attribution of mental states changes over the course of the narrative with the 
knowledge Ripley collects from observations and interpretations. Thus I argue that 
spectators’ ToM is similarly challenged and conditioned, and this conditioning affords a 
pleasurable ToM workout.  
 To bring the union of ToM’s evolutionary and environmental history full circle, I 
also remark in Chapter Three that Ripley’s mind-reading moments are automatic 
responses ensuring her survival but are only necessary in social situations and only 
developed through the influence of Ripley’s environment. I demonstrate how this, too, 
corresponds with spectatorship, since knowledge of horror tropes influences viewers’ 
interpretation of Alien. For instance, spectators may note that a strong-willed female 
usually survives in the slasher film, but her characterization still resists their standard 
gender conventions. This example of gender is frequently revisited in Chapters Two and 
Three as one of the binaries complicated by Alien’s posthuman method of identification. 
As with Chapter Two and its demonstration with Ash, I use Ripley as another 
manifestation of a posthuman existence that rejects strict and finite categories. With 
Chapter Three’s focus on the conditioning of spectatorial ToM, I illustrate the constant 
fluidity and transformation of mind reading for Ripley and her viewers, and how it all 
points to Alien’s delivery of a pleasurable and intensive workout for spectators that adds 
to their ever-developing ToM. 
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 On the surface, Ash and Ripley represent a number of distinct categories, such as 
human/android, hardwired/conditioned, and masculine/feminine, but these distinctions 
become indistinct after examining Ash’s and Ripley’s expected actions and behaviors 
with the actions and behaviors they actually perform. Whether deceiving, revealing, 
employing, or extracting information, Ash and Ripley demonstrate ToM processes, which 
invariably calls upon spectators to do the same. Also, the entanglement of various 
binaries that these two characters exhibit is demonstrative of how ToM is in a constant 
state of flux. Though it is not a matter of survival for Alien’s viewers to properly 
anticipate the thoughts and intentions of on-screen characters, it nevertheless adds to 
spectators’ stream of information and prods them towards more pleasurable stimulations 
of ToM. Ridley Scott’s film remarkably modifies and confronts this cognitive faculty 
through its employment of the horror genre’s unstable reality. But the information 
interpreted by viewers after watching Alien can network and negotiate with other visual 
narratives, too. Whatever spectators derive from one cinematic experience will invariably 
affect how they interact with and respond to others. In short, Ash’s and Ripley’s changing 
posthuman identities is similar to spectators’ ToM; it is a pleasurable process rather than 
a fixed experience beginning and ending with Alien’s credits.  
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Chapter Two:  
The ‘Hardwired’ Mind: Programmed Character and  
Spectator Theories of Mind in Alien 
 Scientists of evolutionary psychology argue that Theory of Mind emerged during 
a massive neurocognitive evolution in the Pleistocene era as a hardwired mechanism 
allowing humans to acclimate to social conditions (Zunshine 7). In another remote area of 
study, it is argued that science fiction creates, to a large extent, “the distinction between 
nature and culture” by presenting man-made technologies like the supercomputer 
(Schelde 13). With these two topics combined, Alien’s android figure, Ash, is an 
exemplary model of both ‘hardwired’ ToM evolution and nature/culture. He operates as 
the film’s secondary antagonist and is programmed with a specific set of instructions that 
go against his human coworkers’ best interest. As a result, Ash’s hardwiring appears in 
league with the same forces that helped evolve humans several eons ago. With this 
biological angle, pleasure exists through the engagement of spectators’ predisposed ToM, 
which, similar to Ash’s electrical impulses, prods viewers to perform and develop mind 
reading.  
 The hardwiring faculty of ToM and science fiction’s nature/culture dichotomy are 
therefore assembled together in the character of Ash. Yet in spite of programmed drives 
inherent in Ash and his spectators, I aim to prove how ToM does not function 
mechanically but is influenced by social surroundings and the invariable cultural 
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conditioning that accompanies everyday interactions, observations, and interpretations. 
As a result, this figure of artificial intelligence is meant to do more than primitive 
computations or adhere to predetermined binary codes. Ash cannot simply comply to or 
reject commands but must outwit, empathize with, or challenge the ToM of his human 
counterparts. To understand and anticipate human complexities, a conditioned ToM is 
warranted, not simply a programmed one. Thus Ash can be placed among a social species 
for his journey. Like humans, Ash perfectly melds the hardwired and environmentally-
adapted features of ToM, allowing him to better interact with and interpret his 
surroundings. Incidentally, Ash’s significance to this discussion lies in his very ‘nature.’ 
Functioning as a cyborg, Ash’s existence as both mechanical and organic positions him 
outside a binary, which is where spectatorial ToM is located, since it, too, enlists the 
biological and the cultural. The entanglement of this binary is not only appropriate to 
horror’s penchant for disrupting cultural codes, but it also stimulates, in intense and 
pleasurable ways, viewers’ ToM, pushing them to better adapt to the realities of their 
world or an irregular one in a film like Alien. 
 Endowed with a hardwired directive, Ash uses his ToM to calculate his fellow 
crewmembers’ actions and influence their decisions. His corporate employer Weyland-
Yutani (most often introduced simply as The Company) designs Ash to ensure a safe 
transport of the alien life form at the expense of the other crewmembers, and Ash’s use of 
ToM nearly achieves this. Thomas B. Byers deduces, “The crew’s ordeals and their 
deaths result in large part from the fact that they cannot tell Ash from themselves until it 
is too late” (40-41). Byers’ observation is undoubtedly true, since all but Ripley meet 
their end because of Ash’s crafty performance. His mechanical design is masked; Ash’s 
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communication with others exceeds automatic responses, because his ToM adapts in 
varying social scenarios to complex behavior. In one particular scene, a few 
crewmembers, Dallas, Lambert, and Kane, explore the source of a derelict ship’s distress 
call, while Ash and Ripley remain aboard the Nostromo to analyze the situation. After 
interpreting that the call is a warning transmission, Ripley notifies Ash over an intercom. 
It is important to note here that because of this form of communication, Ripley cannot see 
Ash’s reactions but can only hear them, which impairs her ToM judgment to analyze only 
auditory cues rather than visual signals. To explicate, Ripley’s intention to go out after 
the crew is barely uttered before Ash already anticipates Ripley’s thought and hangs his 
head in dismay. This physical gesture would certainly appear suspicious to Ripley, but 
over voice transmission, Ash can effortlessly deceive her. Ash responds to Ripley’s 
concern, “What’s the point?” but promptly realizes this comes off as a callous remark and 
revises, “I mean, by the time it takes to get there, they’ll know if it’s a warning or not, 
yes?” Ripley considers the logic in this and remains aboard the ship.    
 Understanding that Ripley’s original decision could ruin The Company’s secret 
mission, Ash cunningly maneuvers her to a different course of action. He even ends with 
the rhetorical “yes?” so as to preserve Ripley’s feeling of autonomy. Allowing her to 
believe she is not forced into a decision is pivotal; it thwarts any suspicion about Ash’s 
real motive, since Ripley can interpret his reply as a composed and logical suggestion 
rather than a desperate demand. However, Ash’s ability to assess Ripley’s ToM and 
conceal his own influences her decision-making. Having the upper hand, Ash strives to 
hide specific information, which permits him to control Ripley’s interpretations of his 
behavior. Not to say her ToM is faulty, but Ash knows more about the situation than 
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Ripley, since The Company has programmed him with secret “Order #937: Bring back 
alien life form. Crew expendable.” This mastery and fallibility of ToM between Ash and 
Ripley replicates spectatorial experiences with the film, since false inferences can be 
made about characters that Alien, and any other film, deliberately misrepresent. To 
borrow Liza Zunshine’s words, within ToM interactions, 
  mind-reading, mind-misreading, and mind-concealing are truly equal  
  opportunity endeavors, even if specific historical epochs have worked hard 
  to ascribe either subhuman or superhuman qualities to [characters] of  
  specific social and ethnic backgrounds. …One mind is as good a candidate 
  for being concealed, misread, and willfully misrepresented as any   
  other. (138) 
Horror films, and Alien particularly, conceal minds and have them misread, but pleasure 
stems from forming assumptions, renegotiating these assumptions as more observations 
are made, and continuing to stimulate the ToM process. Good horror films also go against 
the very mores they set up in their storyline, since this produces an intense cognitive 
workout for spectators. For example, the beginning of Alien presents a benevolent 
Company that orders its crew to investigate a possible SOS signal, but it is later unveiled 
that a multilayered betrayal scheme is in the works. This experience generates enjoyment, 
as viewers are stirred into forming more questions and interpretations as the film 
progresses. Turning the screw once more, horror carries out these ToM games 
inconspicuously, as Ash effectively demonstrates with Ripley, and spectators persistently 
improve their ToM through these challenges.  
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 Ash’s ‘mind-reading’ moment with Ripley is of further importance, since he 
understands that his initial remark, “What’s the point?,” would be interpreted as a 
disregard for the other crewmates. Ash does, spectators later discover, harbor a disregard 
for his colleagues, but following the rules of ToM, he considers Ripley’s mental state, not 
just his own. Detecting insensitivity would arouse distrust and cause Ripley to question 
all of Ash’s subsequent actions, since ToM allows Ripley and the spectator to make 
observations and stow them away for later use. Therefore, Ash’s second response appears 
to Ripley as a sensible suggestion that does not necessarily neglect a concern for the 
crew, and Ash knows this. As a science officer, his thought process is built on the 
reputation of being a methodical and rule-oriented worker. It is a clever move on Ash’s 
part to propose a hypothetical and scientific scenario, “by the time it takes to get 
there…,” that plainly indicates a more efficient solution for Ripley: letting the search 
crew discover the warning themselves. It not only keeps Ripley from ruining ‘Order 
#937,’ but also simultaneously prevents her from doubting Ash’s motives in future 
situations, since he stays true to his character as a man of science. Knowing he narrowly 
dodges a failed mission at the hands of Ripley, Ash breathes a heavy sigh of relief before 
the shot transitions.   
  In a moment of frantic revelation later in the film, Ash gets decapitated after 
trying to choke Ripley, to which the ship’s chief engineer Parker shouts in response, “It’s 
a robot! Ash is a goddamned robot!” But the shot does more than present a malformed 
villain getting his just deserts. This instant of Cartesian terror boasts a literal separation of 
mind and body. Through this physical division, viewers observe how Ash seemed to 
previously manifest a human self, though now spectators see Ash’s inner workings as a 
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collection of marbles, tubes, and milky fluid and regard him as machine. Roz Kaveney 
adds, “We see Ash as a monster; to himself he is a chimera, radically compromised by his 
appearance of humanity and capacity to pass” (145). This all provokes a discussion on 
Ash’s posthuman properties, since he has straddled ideological oppositions until the 
moment he is explicitly severed. When Louis Althusser wrote on theoretical 
posthumanism, he noted, “It is impossible to know anything about men” except that “the 
myth of man is reduced to ashes” (qtd. in Maspero 229). In light of Althusser’s last word, 
the very name of Alien’s posthuman cyborg figure and the consequences he presents for 
traditional methods of identification are appropriate. Ash is not Parker’s “goddamned 
robot” that threatens the humanist concept of mankind. His complex identity as a cyborg 
and the biological/cultural ToM that he develops open up a posthuman panorama, 
resultantly expanding spectators’ view of cultural categories and conditioning their ToM 
for more pleasurable readings in Alien’s narrative and beyond.  
 Through the astonishing display of a hardwired and conditioned ToM, Alien 
breaks down ideological oppositions, including human/android. Traditional concepts 
behind machine-minds propose that “sets of binary oppositions” are “programmed into a 
finite set of instructions” that “switch on or off” (Schelde 132-33), which situate the 
behavior of androids in a rigid pose alongside humanity’s versatile performance. But Ash 
is exclusive of this design; he surpasses binary codes in more ways than just the 
mechanical level. Ash bears the mental complexities of a human, such as sarcasm, deceit, 
learning, and memory, and his computer hardwiring, relatable to a person’s genetic 
coding, gives him a predisposed function. Ash’s programmed ToM imparts him with the 
drive to collect information, not to mention he is electronically engineered with motor 
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abilities. But Ash’s conditioned ToM gives him self-awareness and awareness of others. 
In this sense, humanness cannot be restricted to some organic being. Ash’s cyborg 
identity rejects dualistic thinking and complicates the traditional limitations of ‘self’ 
through cultural binaries. Spectators therefore renegotiate such methods of identification 
and condition their ToM to better interpret how other films of the horror genre do the 
same. 
 When dealing with artificial intelligence, Lisa Yaszek’s study of cybernetics 
particularly examines the interesting figure of the cyborg, who is a posthumanist hybrid 
(98), “part-organic, part-technological” (4). Yaszek and other cyberneticists see the new 
body of the twenty-first century in terms of its ability to adapt to and act upon its 
environment through reproductions of messages and signals (7); it is a communications 
network. This unveils the complex condition of Ash, since his ToM corresponds with 
both biological hardwiring and environmental stimuli (just like humans). Ash’s existence 
as a cyborg and the corresponding posthuman ToM he possesses propels viewers past the 
traditional understanding of identity and how ToM operates and into spectators’ own 
posthuman conditions. Ash illustrates Yaszek’s definition masterfully by networking with 
his surroundings through internal programming and external cues.  
 It is also in the moment when the alien monster is introduced that Yaszek’s 
description of this new body takes form. During his evaluation of the creature, Ash 
explains in awe, “It’s adapted remarkably well to our environment,” and Parker, too, 
claims, “It’s like a [hu]man.” These comments certainly correspond with Ash, Ripley, 
and Alien’s spectators as well; the ToM they all possess is a biological artifact that adapts 
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to environments through experience. For Ash particularly, Mary Pharr notes that while he 
catalogues the creatures’ traits, Ash is actually describing his ideal self (135): 
  The perfect organism. Its structural perfection is matched only by its  
  hostility. (Lambert): You admire it. (Ash): I admire its purity. A survivor  
  unclouded by conscience, remorse, or delusions of morality. I can’t lie to  
  you about your chances, but you have my sympathies.  
As Pharr interprets, Ash saw in the alien creature qualities that he could not own himself. 
Though not an image of the ideal machine or “perfect organism,” Ash is not without 
conscience or morality; he has sympathies, albeit they are sarcastically rendered to Ripley 
and the remaining crew, but he still exhibits complex mental traits in this regard. As a 
result, Ash’s capacity for ToM moves him beyond simple electrical impulses.  
 Moreover, Ash’s ToM is not fixed but exists as a conduit between outside forces 
and interior thinking—much like the human spectator processing visual media. To use his 
wording, Ash sets about “collating” information he observes. For example, while in his 
science lab, Ash examines the characteristics of Kane’s facehugger: the parasitic creature 
that attaches itself to Kane’s face in order to implant him with an alien embryo. Ash 
particularly observes that the combination of the facehugger’s structural elements “gives 
him a prolonged resistance to adverse environmental conditions.” Though Ash is 
discussing the facehugger’s acidic blood and outer shell of protein polysaccharides, it is 
notable that the externally and internally motivated functions of Ash’s ToM allow him to 
also resist “adverse environmental conditions.” For example, alluding back to his 
dialogue with Ripley and the distress call, Ash protects himself against skepticism from 
crewmembers by anticipating their thoughts. Ash ‘collates’ observations about his 
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surroundings so as to better adapt to his social environment. In a similar vein, the human 
spectator observes the film, pulls together information and develops inferences so as to 
have a greater understanding of the fictional world they are watching. This is valuable 
and pleasurable to viewers, because, to garner this understanding, they are motivated to 
enhance their ToM in an environment that flexes long-established divisions of gender and 
humanness. These newly presented posthuman categories force spectators’ traditional 
knowledge to also confront “adverse environmental conditions;” but through 
conditioning, spectators’ developing ToM similarly helps them acquire a “prolonged 
resistance” to antiquated modes of identification.   
 Bearing out horror’s entangled identification constructs, Ash’s and Ripley’s 
reversal of gendered behavior is an example of spectators confronting new knowledge 
and adapting. Ash bears the outward appearance and mannerisms of a male, but when 
violently cast out of the closet in his decapitation scene, his design becomes blurred 
(posthuman), seeming to comprise “a perverse sexuality” as a “feminized male-gendered 
creation” (Gallardo and Smith 50). Interestingly, Ash’s disembodiment pitches its flag in 
Carol J. Clover’s territory as a manifestation of slasher narratives’ castrated killer and 
phallicized female-survivor model. Ash undergoes a literal and metaphoric castration, as 
his head is removed from his body at the hands of a strong-willed female. His 
feminization in the moment of his defeat comes from Ash’s status as a “being created, 
defined, controlled, and deprived of power by the patriarchy” (Gallardo and Smith 49), 
namely The Company in Alien’s narrative. The moment he is discovered as a pawn of 
The Company, Ash’s masculine autonomy seems drained like the ejaculate fluid his body 
spurts out. 
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 But prior to Ash’s termination, he also complicated the masculine/feminine 
opposition in the film’s early stages. For instance, Ash initially appears as the ideal 
Company man, adhering to the rules and regulations enforced by his employers and his 
profession. But when Kane is brutally attacked, and his health becomes dependent upon 
treatment, Ash apparently loses his rationality; in one swift benevolent motion, he opens 
the airlock (against Ripley’s command) to get Kane aboard, which effectively misleads 
viewers’ readings of him. Even in retrospect, the posthuman is borne out as Ash 
complicates rigid categorical codes by appearing compassionate and conniving 
simultaneously. In his article, “Feminism, Humanism, and Science in Alien,” critic James 
H. Kavanagh proffers an analysis of the cyborg’s complexities and spectatorial 
identifications with it. Kavanagh recurrently remarks how spectators invest sympathies in 
characters exhibiting heroic or benevolent traits, and with these observations, viewers can 
slowly register the film’s heroes and villains (75). Without intending to wander into the 
field of cognitive studies, Kavanagh discusses how spectators’ sympathies are initially 
guided towards Ash (75), because, by feigning human kindness, he is able to mask his 
sinister intentions. Ash is seemingly concerned for Kane’s condition and violates 
quarantine protocol to allow him aboard the ship for medical assistance, while Ripley is 
unaffected by her comrade’s plight and sticks to protocol despite the pleas from her other 
crewmembers. As a man and a man of science, Ash’s compassionate actions seem 
uncharacteristic. For Ripley, this is doubly the case. Science fiction films leading up to 
Alien’s release rejected a female protagonist or at least a female heroine demonstrating 
“rebellious skepticism” (Pharr 135), and spectators might expect Ripley to follow her 
female counterpart, Lambert, and exhibit emotional weakness. Similarly, science and 
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reason are characteristically gendered masculine disciplines. In order for Ash to perform 
a ‘feminized’ act of compassion and supposedly nurse Kane back to health, he must 
reject his responsibilities as science officer and break protocol. Thus, both Ash and 
Ripley disassemble gendered cultural constructs through their performances.  
 In hindsight, this scene displaying Kane’s plight even confounds the clues that 
Ash is a cyborg; it would seem Ripley is unfeeling and spouts off involuntary responses, 
while Ash possesses human sympathy and altruistic behavior. That which made Ash and 
Ripley distinct from one another gets reversed, but Thomas B. Byers offers a crucial 
point for my argument, noting, “What has traditionally been regarded as a difference 
between the human and the robotic” is actually a “difference within the human” (44). In a 
way, Byers is correct, since his argument rejects dualist thinking; however, to term this 
site of paradoxical differences as ‘human’ is problematic for a posthuman discussion, 
because it bears certain ideological assumptions that are already being beautifully 
challenged by Ash and Ripley. Since both characters have demonstrated a capacity for 
cruel or charitable actions, Ash and Ripley once more establish the posthuman 
renegotiation of human/android and masculine/feminine oppositions in the same way that 
they renegotiate the biological/cultural binary of ToM. Their posthuman identities, and 
more importantly their posthuman cognitive abilities, close the conventional gaps 
between these previously opposing categories.  
 Moreover, this scene provides an illustration of horror’s momentary split from 
spectatorial expectation, since the humanness/humaneness of these characters goes 
against convention (androids are insensitive, while humans are compassionate) as well as 
their gendered behavior. Though viewers may form inferences that are further 
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complicated or proven false as Alien progresses, pleasure is not stimulated by how similar 
the story is to spectators’ real world, but is a result of the film’s contributions to their 
ever-developing ToM. Also, the posthuman circumstances surrounding Ash’s and 
Ripley’s narratives potentially equip viewers with posthuman understandings, since they 
are compelled to consider the fluidity of cultural categories. 
 From these scenes, spectatorial gratification may also generate from a variety of 
factors, such as the strong attractive female overcoming her enemies, the alien creature’s 
gory method of attack, or perhaps the existence of a cyborg and the futuristic possibilities 
he puts forward, but they are all inextricably bound to the process of tracking mental 
states and adding to or altering ToM. For instance, spectators observing Ash’s actions 
prior to his reveal as a double agent may devise specific reasons for his behavior based on 
what the film has decided to disclose or their own cultural contexts. Ash’s slight irritation 
with Ripley during the distress call scene might actually appear to first-time viewers as 
frustration. He told the crew that their contracts mandated a search but now feels 
responsible for putting their lives in danger and is burdened by the mistake. But bearing 
the reputation as a man devoted to knowledge, rules, and mathematical accuracy 
(something the film strives to portray), Ash may be incapable of admitting his lapse in 
thinking. Viewers later realize how these initially insignificant observations actually had 
great bearing on the issue at hand. Ash is a traitorous cyborg, and in retrospect there were 
clues misread or perhaps concealed, which now lead spectators to their ‘Aha!’ moment. 
 Pleasure released in a moment of revelation exists when information gathered on 
various minds finds its proper place or at least, for the horror film, finds a place at all. 
Noël Carroll would say this is the climactic instant in horror when questions are answered 
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for the spectator—even the questions spectators did not intentionally pose before more 
information solved them anyway. But I contend that moments like Ash’s unveiling may 
only lead to more questions for Alien’s spectators to consciously or unconsciously 
consider, including, ‘Who else on the Nostromo might be a traitor?’ ‘Are all cyborgs 
mistrustful?,’ ‘Is this a recurring theme in sci-fi horror?’ In this way, Alien’s narrative 
interacts and exercises with viewers’ ever-changing ToM even after the closing credits. 
More importantly, the posthuman conditions that Alien demonstrates is a common 
tendency in the horror genre, as cultural categories are stretched, ignored, or perverted. 
Experiencing the complication of binaries through the posthuman figures Ash and Ripley 
pushes viewers to move beyond conventional readings of such cinematic narratives, and 
the biological/cultural blend of ToM prepares spectators for these posthuman moves. 
Though this chapter underscores the programmed origins of ToM and Ash’s seemingly 
robotic manufacture, Donna J. Haraway bolsters my argumentative turn towards the 
posthuman when famously noting, “We are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids 
of machine and organism; in short, we are all cyborgs” (qtd. in Bell 99).  
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Chapter Three: 
The ‘Conditioned’ Mind: Contextualizing Character and  
Spectator Theories of Mind in Alien 
 A scene unfolds at the height of Alien’s plot showing the eponymous creature 
lurking in the ship’s airshafts. Nostromo’s captain, Dallas, decides to brave the 
labyrinthine tunnels and corner the alien with a flamethrower, effectively blasting it from 
the ducts and out into space. Unluckily, the alien escapes detection from the crew’s 
advanced tracking equipment and attacks Dallas before the plan can succeed. The 
remaining survivors, Ash, Lambert, Parker, and Ripley consider several options, but 
Ripley and Parker agree that killing the creature before heading home is the proper 
method. Parker resolutely walks off to “kill that goddamned thing right now,” yet Ripley 
stops him to discuss the details. In this moment that Ripley begins to speak, Parker holds 
up his hand, and Ripley subsequently increases the pitch of her voice. The brief 
remainder of the scene shows the two bickering and helps embellish inferences made by 
spectators: viewers might interpret that Parker intended to quiet Ripley with his hand 
motion because he wants to kill the alien without further debate, and Ripley, 
comprehending Parker’s hand motion, talks louder as a retort. Though this attribution of 
the characters’ states of mind may be incorrect, pleasure occurs in the ability and process 
to make such an inference.  
 Similar to breathing or blinking, Theory of Mind is a biological function allowing 
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people, like Alien’s spectators, to intuitively process observed behavior. However, 
nothing in the mechanical form of Parker’s gesture or Ripley’s voice advises spectators 
on how to interpret the meaning of their actions; it could be assumed that Parker has had 
an arm spasm, and Ripley has gone deaf. A gamut of explanations from the physiological 
to the psychological could occur. Yet spectators read and make sense of Parker’s and 
Ripley’s mannerisms within a context derived from their present culture and experiences. 
This context delimits the scope of possible wrong explanations. For instance, the 
hardwired institution of ToM kicks in while watching the scene, but knowledge resulting 
from spectators’ personal history or knowledge gained from Alien’s exposition eliminates 
irrelevant interpretations. Thus, spectators can explain or predict better correlations 
between the characters’ actions and their underlying mental states.  
 In the reality of the film, Ripley’s anticipation of forthcoming events and 
assumptions about others are also precipitated by endless observations. Ripley’s survival 
to the end provides spectators with the longest streak of ToM interaction in a single 
character, and her status as human ostensibly marks Ripley as an example of this 
particular chapter’s slant in ToM’s hardwired/conditioned paradigm. Chapter Two 
initially focused on ToM as an automatic cognitive tool best personified by the film’s 
android character, Ash. Like Ash’s, Ripley’s ToM is effortless and involuntary, but as a 
human, her social environment more clearly influences and contextualizes it. In fact for 
Ripley and the spectators watching her, “social survival depends on being able to 
imagine—correctly, incorrectly, approximately, self-servingly, bizarrely—other people’s 
thoughts, desires, and intentions around the clock” (Zunshine 18). The cognitive ‘health’ 
of ToM relies on constant stimulation and exercise, which is conceivably another reason 
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why fiction, like cinema and particularly Alien, is enjoyable. Alien, therefore, constructs a 
ToM playground for its characters and viewers. Ripley possesses a conditioned ToM, 
Alien’s spectators possess a conditioned ToM, and pleasure arises through the 
conditioning of ToM’s hardwired function. 
 Having established and complicated the presence of a hardwired and conditioned 
ToM in Chapter Two, I deepen the discussion with spectators’ cultural context as a 
guiding force for their cinematic readings. Gender, a topic visited in the last chapter, is 
bound up in cultural history as a ‘construction’ enabled by the public’s expectations. 
Interestingly then, Judith Newton aptly recounts how Alien’s gendered behavior does not 
align with tradition and therefore challenges the contextual history that informs 
spectators’ readings. Newton asserts:     
  Ripley’s character appropriates qualities traditionally identified   
  with male heroes. Ripley is skilled, she makes hard, unsentimental   
  decisions; she is a firm but humane leader; she has the hero’s traditional,  
  and thrilling resources in the face of the monster…and her quest is not  
  diluted by the introduction of a love plot. (84)   
Then again, unconventional genders are a common characteristic of the modern slasher 
films with which Alien engages. Most notably, Carol J. Clover makes this observation 
while outlining slasher cinema’s creation of the phallicized female protagonist, who is 
usually forceful, proactive, masculine, and abstains from sex (this last bit being 
important, since it withholds the idea of an accessible female body). Among the group of 
horror films’ female heroes, Ripley characterizes Clover’s description and the values and 
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virtues common to male protagonists, since she is rational, willful, largely appears 
androgynous, and has a masculine-sounding name. 
 But despite the frequency of horror’s disruption of gender conventions, viewers 
still recognize Alien’s presentation of gender as skewed, because it does not corroborate 
with what they learn in their own environment. Characteristics of the sci-fi genre are 
compromised in Alien, since the film abandons what Patricia Melzer notes is a “mainly 
white, male, heterosexual” or “male-oriented genre” (6, 7). Melzer continues to explain 
that much of classic sci-fi fiction “relies on the binary of man/woman in its reimagining 
of social orders” (220). Melzer’s comment further establishes Alien’s horror status, 
because characters like Ripley violate heteronormative behavior and destabilize gender 
differences. Alien notably blurs the distinction between several established binaries, 
including masculine/feminine and human/android as demonstrated through Ash’s and 
Ripley’s separate treatment of Kane. As noted in Chapter Two, the ‘male’ Ash appears 
benevolent and endearing to Kane’s condition while the ‘female’ Ripley comes off as 
aggressive and insensitive.  
 Ripley’s complication of these binaries is further referenced in Vivian Sobchack’s 
study of the film, as she notes, “The original script of Alien conceived Ripley as a male,” 
however “few changes were made to accommodate the differences that such a sex change 
in the character might present. Ripley, indeed, is hardly female (and considered by her 
shipmates as hardly human)” (106). Sobchack examines how the film tears down such 
binaries through the phrases, “hardly female” and “hardly human.” Ripley resultantly 
exhibits a posthuman condition by going beyond ideological constraints; she is not 
wholly ‘female’ or ‘human’ in the traditional sense of these terms, nor is she wholly their 
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opposite. Clover also seems to touch upon the possibility of posthumanism when 
analyzing female heroes’ disruption of gender constructs. By discussing a “loosening of 
categories” (63), Clover mentions a type of fluidity occurring in the identity of horror’s 
female protagonists. When interpreting the surpassing of such ideological oppositions by 
the character Ripley (or Ash), spectators also progress towards a posthumanist reading 
and, with the conditioning of their hardwired minds through these readings, a posthuman 
ToM. This posthuman conditioning fosters spectatorial pleasure, even amid the 
displeasure of a strange and threatening world, since it develops and improves viewers’ 
ToM to rethink cultural binaries and the fluidity and vacillation that occur in either real or 
fictional social settings. 
 As a result, pleasure lies in the process of and experimentation with ToM despite 
Alien’s break from spectator’s expectations of character conduct. Leda Cosmides and 
John Tooby explain that “within the context of the extraordinary diversity of the living 
world,” humans evolved to interpret “information based on relationships that were ‘true’ 
only temporarily, locally, and contingently rather than universally and stably” (53, 57). 
This substantiates why pleasure in the horror film cannot stem from how closely a 
narrative follows strict cultural conventions. Though cultural conventions have a running 
dialogue with horror, spectatorial pleasure results from viewers’ ToM responding and 
adapting to whatever rules the film puts forth. As Cosmides and Tooby would put it, 
viewers read a horror film and rely on its ‘truths’ inside a space of conditions to which 
they are applicable. This tension between knowledge derived in the real world and film 
world causes an intense workout for spectators’ ToM and prompts them to consider the 
differences after the film has ended. Yet viewers still interpret Alien’s novel arrangement 
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of cultural constructs and construe the meaning of the film’s remaining scenes based on 
them. To explicate, Alien’s spectators (upon recognizing Ripley as a female) soon learn 
that Ripley’s behavior is uncharacteristic of the gender they understand outside of the 
film, but then place Ripley in new contextual parameters and deem her a figure likely to 
exhibit gutsy behavior. It is then unsurprising to viewers that Ripley would approach the 
alien creature at the film’s end rather than cower in fear. Viewing subsequent scenes 
where Ripley exhibits ‘male’ traits should no longer startle spectators’ expectations of 
her. They learned from previous observations that Ripley, among others, act differently, 
thus equipping themselves with more knowledge, which better informs spectators’ 
inferences about characters in future readings.  
 Ripley’s feminine/masculine empowerment and Alien’s continued ToM interplay 
are also examinable in the most befitting of places: Ash’s science laboratory. Outraged at 
Ash’s violation of “basic quarantine law,” Ripley questions his decision to allow Kane 
and his “guest” aboard the ship. Through their discussion, Ripley emphasizes the dangers 
of allowing Kane on Nostromo, “You forgot the science division’s basic quarantine 
law…Unfortunately by breaking quarantine, you risk everybody’s life.” Ash, in an 
attempt to validate breaking policy, strikes up a seemingly benevolent stance, “Maybe I 
should’ve left [Kane] outside. Maybe I’ve jeopardized the rest of us, but it was a risk I 
was willing to take.” Yet Ripley detects an incongruity and immediately questions Ash’s 
reasoning, “It’s a pretty big risk for a science officer- it’s not exactly out of the manual, is 
it?” Mirroring Ash’s response during the ‘distress call’ scene described in Chapter Two, 
Ripley’s comment ends with a rhetorical question but this time as an effort to highlight 
Ash’s professional flaw. Previous interactions informed Ripley’s and spectators’ original 
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assessment of Ash as a man adhering to protocol, because, for the past forty-five minutes 
of the film, he has only been seen analyzing data, following a mandated schedule, and 
restating details from the Company’s contract. In fact, his communication with the rest of 
the crew, and any camaraderie that could result from it, is limited by these activities. 
Based on these observations, Ash would appear as a man devoted to his employed 
position as a science officer. His actions leading up to Kane’s attack are prompted by a 
desire for logical resolutions, especially those grounded in The Company’s policy. 
 What’s more, following their long hypersleep at the film’s start, Ash does not 
participate while the crew blathers on at the breakfast table. Instead, he seems annoyed by 
the inane discussion and calls attention to a message from the ship’s supercomputer, 
Mother. As a result, Ripley is provoked to interrogate Ash when he does not act in 
accordance with her reading of him as a practical and methodical man. To satisfy the 
biological and empirical impulses of ToM, Ripley must collect new information about 
Ash to revise her assumptions, which results in her trip to his lab. Ripley has the innate 
function to continue stimulating her ToM, but also, within the social context, it is 
essential for her to make sense of Ash’s behavior to better interact in, survive in, and 
anticipate the ship’s communal environment. For instance, when Ash ends Ripley’s 
unprompted inquisition with a dismissive statement, “You do your job and let me do 
mine,” her suspicion is ignited. Ash’s response could read as an assertion that he is 
capable of following policy, or perhaps he is baring his desire to remain focused on 
Kane’s treatment without further distraction; yet Ripley’s ToM affords her a 
supplemental reading of the situation.  
 After witnessing Ash’s careless decision to open the airlock and admit Kane on 
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board, Ripley comprehends that professional earnestness does not always adhere with 
Ash’s actions. He did not comply with the rules of his occupation during the quarantine 
failure therefore causing Ripley to doubt Ash’s seemingly renewed sense of 
professionalism. The desperation and slight patronizing tone in Ash’s abrupt end to the 
conversation are also thinly veiled, and Ripley, sensing it, decides to keep her suspicions 
alive and interpret more observations in an effort to situate her doubts within her growing 
ToM. Harkening back to Noël Carroll’s writings, this seems to similarly correspond with 
finding answers or “outcomes to questions” (in this case, Ripley’s ‘suspicions’) that are 
“put in motion” (179). However, as I have argued throughout this study, ToM is in 
constant motion, and whether spectators agree at this moment in Alien’s narrative that 
Ash is deceitful or not, Ripley’s skepticism is added to the currents of their thinking. 
After all, the crew’s captain, Dallas, cues viewers to remain on constant alert. When 
demanding an explanation for allotting Ash custody of a comatose Kane, Ripley 
expresses her distrust in Ash to which Dallas replies, “I don’t trust anybody.” His remark 
is a warning for spectators when reading and devising explanations for character’s 
actions, and with the limited knowledge of each character this early in the film, Dallas’ 
words appear prophetic. Consequently, watching the film becomes a ToM game for 
viewers to invest their mental energies in successfully predicting a traitor.  
 But apart from this potentially drawn-out task to detect betrayal, spectators know 
for the moment that Ripley expects some underhanded scheme from Ash. In the same 
scene that records Ripley and Parker arguing over a plan to kill the alien, Ripley asks Ash 
for advice, “Any suggestions from you or Mother?” After a few measured seconds, Ash 
reports, “No, we’re still collating.” The “no” that Ripley hears prompts her to 
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momentarily shut her eyes: a physical act not far from the effects of a deep mournful 
sigh. Ripley follows this gesture with a bellowing out of what viewers comprehend is an 
uneasy laugh. Spectators thus observe Ripley’s ‘scoff’ to Ash and are able to explain her 
underlying mental state: she does not believe him. This is quickly validated as Ripley 
aggressively questions his answer: 
  You’re what? You’re still collating? I find that hard to believe. (Ash):  
  Well what would you like me to do? (Ripley): Just what you’ve been 
  doing, Ash. … Nothing.  
Ripley’s verbal assault toward Ash illustrates her distrust, which correlates with viewers’ 
perception of her physical gestures. Spectators interpret the scene with observations that 
confirm previous suspicions about the film’s characters; for instance, Ash is not aiding 
the crew’s dilemma, as Ripley fervently pointed out after quarantine policy was breached. 
But these observations also lead viewers to form further predictions and continue 
exercising their ToM. Building off of my example, spectators might assume that Ash 
does not help, because he may be too timid to confront the alien, or he might be telling 
the truth about his fruitless analysis of the creature. Either way, questions and 
observations continue to emerge during ToM interplay. For Ripley and Alien’s spectators, 
questions and answers are not stagnant pieces of information stirred into motion or 
collected at any time. Rather they pleasurably add to an ever-flowing ToM and are 
subject to personal interpretation: a process that compels the characters in and viewers of 
the film to persist with mind reading. 
 While commenting on ToM unknowingly, Patricia Melzer proclaims, “The 
[Alien] movies can be treated as ‘one extended work’ based on the unity provided by the 
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protagonist, Ellen Ripley” and later attributes this amalgamation of the Alien series to 
“the expectations of the audience” (108). These ‘expectations’ to which Melzer refers are 
the very ones created and regulated by ToM. As I argue in this chapter and the previous 
one, Alien and other such works of horror cinema endlessly exercise rather than 
automatically perform given psychological tendencies. The entanglement of gender 
constructs and posthuman properties calls upon spectators to interact and interpret Alien’s 
story by using their ToM. The contextualization of a hardwired cognitive function also 
propels ToM beyond a strict Darwinian understanding that may only discuss the purpose 
of its biological origins. Instead of operating as a fixed storehouse, ToM is a current of 
information and experiences that both alters and is altered. In the case of Ash’s reveal in 
Alien as a traitorous character, theories about his behavior may seem permanently 
answered for viewers, since they now understand he was a traitor for The Company. Yet 
this information, and how spectators and Ripley perceive it, is not stored as an 
unchanging morsel of memory. Spectators watching the film again, the rest of the Alien 
quadrilogy, or other films with cyborgs reuse its information during mind-reading 
moments. Pleasure in this flowing process is simply outlined: observations and their 
interpretations lead to plausible answers that fuel spectators to form further assumptions 
and further conclusions.  
 Because expectations and evaluations of Alien are governed by viewer’s 
developing knowledge and experience with cultural ideologies, Ripley perfectly 
replicates spectators’ ToM performance; her ToM is continually modified by her history, 
and the second film of the quadrilogy, Aliens, wholly demonstrates this. Following her 
traumatic experiences with Ash, Ripley assumes that all corporate-owned cyborgs are of 
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the same deceptive nature. This is notably demonstrated in a scene aboard the Sulaco, a 
Company-owned ship headed towards the now colonized planet where the crew from 
Alien first encountered the alien life form. Sent on a mission with several marines, Ripley 
sits at a table during dinner and is quickly joined by a man named Bishop. After 
congenially offering some cornbread, Bishop examines a cut on his finger from which a 
drip of white synthetic blood emerges. In horror, Ripley censures her employer, “You 
never said anything about an android being on board!.” Bishop asks why she is 
concerned, but Ripley refuses communication with him and later violently knocks the 
tray of cornbread from his hand, stating, “Just stay away from me, Bishop! You got that 
straight?!” There is brief exposition offered by another character to explain Ripley’s 
consternation, but spectators of the first and second films can already make sense of the 
situation. Ripley’s conduct is fueled by inferences made from a previous relationship that 
seems analogous to the current one she is experiencing; thus Ripley bases her 
assumptions about cyborgs within the only context she has. This is also true for 
spectators who initially read a horror film against their cultural context, but later (similar 
to Ripley observing Bishop’s self-sacrificing choices) spectators condition and reevaluate 
their readings within the film’s new context. The pleasure inherent in developing and 
exercising ToM pushes spectators to also consider Alien’s context and its posthuman 
breakdown of cultural binaries in their real environment, since, as Cosmides and Tooby 
affirmed, no information is “universal and stable” (57). Indeed, the use of a posthuman 
ToM may help viewers find that renegotiating and expanding personal and cultural 
knowledge is also valuable to circumstances outside Alien’s narrative.  
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Chapter Four: 
Conclusion: Pleasure Beyond the Narrative 
  To understand pleasure in the horror film, my thesis started by responding to the 
writings of Carol J. Clover and Noël Carroll, both of whom offer momentous 
contributions for situating spectatorial enjoyment in horror narratives. Clover’s 
psychoanalytic study observes that young male viewers begin to satisfy sadistic 
tendencies and later cross gender lines to identify with horror’s female hero. Carroll’s 
cognitive theory finds that euphoric relief is aroused as questions and expectations are 
fulfilled by the film’s conclusion. Both arguments discuss the cultural categories, 
including gender, that horror complicates. My argument acknowledged these 
explanations but moved beyond theories that understand pleasure through singular and 
rather fixed experiences that begin and end a film. Theory of Mind approaches the 
question of pleasure differently, since it is a process felt before, during, and after a 
narrative that offers pleasurable conditionings of knowledge. As demonstrated with 
Ridley Scott’s Alien, this mind reading ability permits viewers to form interpretations that 
call upon personal experiences and cultural contexts. ToM causes expectations to be 
challenged and knowledge to be modified when watching Alien and other films of its 
genre and encourages spectators to navigate the worlds portrayed in cinematic fiction 
while also structuring and restructuring those worlds. ToM is, after all, a stream 
constantly flowing and changing with more observations and experiences; it is an 
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explanation that takes into account the flux and impermanence of information (not all 
spectators perceive, interpret, or remember a scene the same way) as well as the diversity 
of viewers watching the film (men, women, non-horror fans, and horror buffs all possess 
ToM).  
 To ascribe meaning to observed behavior either in reality or in films like Alien, I 
demonstrated that both biological and cultural ToM is unavoidable for individuals. Yet 
ToM is generally targeted as an idea solely belonging to evolutionary discourse, which is 
assumed to reduce human experiences to biologically fixed conditions. By introducing 
‘evolution’ into the methodology, a conceptual framework is produced, which commits 
all analysis to historicization. To showcase this biological and cultural synthesis, 
Chapters Two and Three discuss how ToM operates as both hardwired cognition and 
conditioned process. Ash and Ripley are used as beacons for these chapters, because they 
interestingly correspond with programmed versus nurtured minds and develop both sides 
of the notorious biological/cultural duality. Borrowing Ash’s description of the alien in 
one scene, this duality is “an interesting combination of elements, making him a tough 
little son of a bitch.” Though spoken to illustrate the brutal tenacity of Kane’s alien 
facehugger, this last remark, “tough son of a bitch,” certainly describes Ash’s and 
Ripley’s characters, since they, too, prove determined in their plans to survive and adapt 
well to their social environment with the combination of their biological and cultural 
ToMs. 
 Ash’s and Ripley’s actions also complicate other binary categories of the film, 
including masculine/feminine and human/android, as spectators observe them carry out 
behavior that contradicts outward identities. As noted in Chapters Two and Three, Ash is 
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effeminately characterized by his compassionate dealings with Kane, while Ripley 
appears aggressive and inhuman. This is significant to spectators’ experience with the 
film, since it challenges their ToM and prods them to renegotiate cultural binaries. Alien 
is not solely unsettling because of the threats concealed throughout the film’s narrative; it 
also invokes ideas that seem culturally uncategorizable for spectators, because they 
violate dominant conceptual constructions. However, the film does not substitute one 
binary part for the other between Ash and Ripley; it reminds spectators how these two 
characters engender both sides of such ideological oppositions. 
 For instance, prior to the events involving Ash’s violent struggle with Ripley, 
spectators observe two close-ups of the characters exchanging penetrating stares that 
anticipate a fight. In one shot, the camera is fixed on Ripley and reveals a sudden 
nosebleed (brought on by hysteria) emerging from her face. Within seconds, this is trailed 
by a full-framed shot of Ash’s face, as a trickle of milky solution falls from his forehead. 
The scene captures an explosive moment in more ways than the angry hollers and 
spurting decapitated head that follow it. In a straightforward manner, Ripley’s nosebleed 
suggests menstrual blood while Ash’s sweat is evocative of pre-seminal fluid. These 
images correspond with feminine and masculine attributes, but the shot/reverse shot that 
connects Ash and Ripley also suggest they never remain within the confines of a binary 
system. The blood and synthetic milk solution also play with concepts of organic versus 
artificial liquids. By showing how horror challenges and transforms the categories of 
spectators’ known worlds, Alien provides constant vacillation for spectators’ expectations 
of characters. Moreover, while the vacillation and instability of cultural constructions, 
like humanness or gender, may be sources of displeasure, Alien’s ever-developing flow of 
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anticipation, interpretation, and transformation supplies its viewers with enjoyment by 
exercising their ToMs and pointing out both its and culture’s changeability.   
 Spectatorial pleasure is further advanced if one reconsiders the film’s alien as 
something more than a terrifying beast. One effort of my study has highlighted the 
ostensible differences between Ash and Ripley and then revealed how these differences 
become complicated for the spectator. An unexpected figure of posthumanism that also 
straddles these binary differences is the alien creature; after all, it is a biological entity 
that quickly adapts to its environment, is both natural and synthetic, and appears 
genderless. Throughout the series, a great deal of the alien’s attributes and life cycle are 
explained, particularly that it acquires many of the physical traits of the host from which 
it is delivered, thus giving the creature the ability adapt to its host’s surroundings. Critic 
Kristin Thompson notes that the vessel (facehugger) through which the alien gets 
deposited into its host is “clearly a grotesque amalgam of caricatural female and male 
human genitalia” and concludes that it is “presented as equally male and female” (300). 
Its eruption through Kane’s male body further challenges these categories. In this way, 
the alien is a posthuman figure moving beyond traditional methods of identification and 
blurring cultural constructions. Notably, Nostromo’s entire crew dies at the hands of the 
alien except for the only other posthuman agents of the film, Ash and Ripley. Their 
posthumanity seems to exclude them from the same end their peers meet, because the rest 
of the crew follows dominant ideological constructions, appearing unwaveringly 
masculine or feminine and always human. As the rest of the series progresses, the alien 
becomes predator and prey in a way that is analagous to spectators’ minds. Viewers are 
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subject to Alien’s narrative and the new rules it puts forth, but they are simultaneously 
empowered when assembling the film’s information through the domains of their ToM. 
 Ultimately, my argument comments on the entanglements that horror cinema 
regularly presents through unfamiliar characters that go past rigid cultural methods of 
classification. By noting the posthuman properties of Alien’s characters, Ash and Ripley, 
spectators can find that they, too, renegotiate dualistic ways of thinking and transform 
permanently situated information and conditions into a stream of ever-developing and 
ever-changing knowledge. Accordingly, Alien moves spectators into the posthuman 
register, since the encounter with and interpretation of the film’s posthuman characters 
are contained within a genre made up of unstable categories. Alien’s achievement is in its 
explicit demonstration of blurred binaries that emphasize the flexibility of posthuman 
modes of identification and even the fluidity of ToM itself. Judith Halberstam and Ira 
Livingston add, “pleasure derives from spectacular enactments of the posthuman” rather 
than through traditional “mechanisms of identification” (221), which reaffirms how 
horror can be enjoyable without its adherence to standard cultural constructions. Since 
the biologically driven and culturally steered ToM is a process continually employing 
viewers’ experiences, pleasure in the horror film is not secluded to the two hours of 
watching a narrative. Rather it stimulates spectators’ minds to continue intensely reading 
and developing their ToM and potentially transforms how viewers read their worlds 
outside the film. The fun of fear appears self-contradictory at first, yet stems from a 
reality in which spectators in films like Alien observe, think, and use their thoughts and 
interpretations not just to interact with their cinematic and real environments, but also to 
challenge, transform, and adapt to them. 
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